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Abstract 
This paper reflects on the nature of the contextual meaning that is often associated with modal 
verbs. Four examples are given of contextual effects that have been discussed in the literature: 
pragmatic strengthening and weakening, dynamic implication, strength of the modality and 
subjective vs. objective modality. It is argued that these four cases are not entirely similar 
when they are considered from the perspective of the semantics-pragmatics interface and the 
categorisation of modal meaning. This study shows what unites and what differentiates these 
four facets of the ‗pragmatics‘ of modals.  
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1. Introduction 
Modal meaning is determined in context. While this is an uncontroversial claim, I 
would like to make explicit the different types of contribution to modal meaning that 
the context makes and to reflect on the impact of the different contextual features on 
categorisation. The paper will be structured as follows: I will first give some examples 
of the different ways in which the context is needed to pin down the message that is 
communicated, and in particular, to pin down the meaning of the modal verb. I will 
then show that the status of the contextual contributions is different:  while some may 
be captured in terms of context-dependent semantics, others are ‗truly‘ pragmatic in 
nature, in the sense that the meaning distinctions are important for the message 
communicated, but they are not important from the perspective of determining the 
explicature. 
 
2. The role of the context in determining the meaning of modals: Some examples 
2.1 Pragmatic strengthening and weakening 
A first set of examples illustrates what Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 176, their 
examples below) have called pragmatic strengthening and pragmatic weakening: 
(1) You may leave now. (boss talking to his secretary)  
(2) You must have one of these cakes. (at an afternoon party)  
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The concepts are quite transparent. While may is a possibility modal, in the context 
in which the sentence is uttered in (1), its meaning has been strengthened into modal 
necessity: the example ―will be construed as an instruction, not mere permission‖ 
(ibid.: 177). The example in (2) illustrates the opposite pragmatic effect: must no 
longer communicates its unmarked meaning of necessity, but rather that of possibility: 
‗it will be taken as an offer rather than an order‘. (ibid.: 177) The following are some 
further examples from the British National Corpus (BNC): 
(3)  Alright, yes. So, you‘re putting her on hold, yes, so you can put your handset 
down. Right, if you can leave your handset at the side, you can see that it 
matures after 75 seconds, brilliant. erm Call parking, right. Okay, right, call 
parking. (BNC, telephone system training course) 
(4)  The British murmur ‗You must come and stay with us some time,‘ and when 
they part they say ‗Let‘s keep in touch‘ and they certainly don‘t mean it, but it 
greases the wheels of intercourse. (BNC) 
A further observation is that the combination of the modal with another lexical 
item may enhance the strengthening/weakening effect, as in the following examples:  
(5)  Of course, this way of looking at things reflects my own bias as an only 
partially reconstructed neurochemist; in practice the neurophysiology may well 
lead -- indeed, in the important cases of Aplysia and long-term potentiation 
discussed next, has led -- the biochemistry and cell biology, pointing the way 
towards cells whose electrical properties and therefore their biochemical 
properties change during memory formation. (BNC) 
(6)  In these days of widespread family planning, you might well think the number 
of unwanted pregnancies is on the decline. You would be wrong. (BNC) 
In (5) it is may well, and in (6) it is might well that trigger pragmatic strengthening. 
Even though the situation is, strictly speaking, presented as possible, the context 
makes it clear that there is a certain degree of inevitability and therefore a tinge of 
necessity or even of factuality. 
A final observation is that certain clauses with modal verbs have developed a 
formulaic status and in this way no longer seem to communicate the meaning they 
literally express. If I may is among the well-known cases where the if-clause is no 
longer a genuine request for permission. Rather, permission is taken for granted. This 
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type of example is different from the previous ones in that the meaning is not 
weakened from necessity to possibility or strengthened from possibility to necessity; 
the special feature here is what is strictly speaking a request for permission boils 
down to taking permission for granted. 
(7) Let me develop the point if I may Jonathan. (ICE-GB)
1
 
The speaker does not wait for Jonathan to agree; he simply holds the floor and 
continues talking. This example touches upon illocutionary force, which is one of the 
key issues at stake in discussions of dynamic implication. 
 
2.2 Indirect speech acts: Dynamic implication 
Palmer (1990) introduces the concept of ‗implication‘ when discussing dynamic 
modality. He writes that the examples that follow do not, in the first place, 
communicate possibility or ability, but ―suggest, by implication, that what is possible 
will, or should, be implemented‖ (ibid.: 86): 
(8a)  I can tell you the reference, if that‘s any help, of the letter. (―It is regularly used 
with I or with exclusive we (‗I and he‘, ‗I and they‘ etc.) to make an offer by the 
speaker or speakers.‖) 
(8b) I‘ll send Lewis down tonight to see what he can pick up in the pubs of Port St 
Mary and then he can call to see you. (with the third person pronoun ―the 
speaker speaks on behalf of someone else, but leaves it vague whether the 
initiative comes from him or not.‖) 
(8c)  You can certainly ring me back this afternoon – there might be something. 
(―with a second person pronoun, it suggests action be taken by the person 
addressed.‖) 
(8d) Do come early and we can have a drink. (―If we is used inclusively (‗you and I‘, 
‗you and we‘) it combines offer and suggestion.‖) 
Here, clearly, the meaning effect is captured in terms of the illocutionary force of 
the utterance in which the modal features. Collins (2009) gives similar examples with 
can, could and might and argues that they should be set apart in a separate class of 
dynamic modality because they imply a directive speech act (see also Facchinetti 
2002):  
                                                             
1
 ICE-GB refers to the British English component of the International Corpus of English. 
On the pragmatics of modal verbs 17 
 
(9a)  And you may remember that the organisations the republics were in the Soviet 
Union competed in the recent Winter Olympics under the title Commonwealth 
of Independent States. (ICE-AUS)
2
 (Collins 2009: 96) (―The literal meaning of 
may […] is dynamic, but a more satisfactory interpretation requires reference to 
its directive illocutionary force.‖) 
(9b) Well I can write on your behalf. (ICE-AUS) (ibid.: 104) (offer) 
(9c)  In your letter to me you say that ―it is not the ownership of the NRMA that is 
under review.‖ Could you explain that to me please? (ICE-AUS) (ibid.: 116) 
(request) 
(9d) Now if that is the form that your publication is going to take um then one of the 
things that you might also think about as an adjunct to your address is the use of 
audio-visuals or at least visuals. (ICE-AUS) (ibid.: 116) (suggestion) 
The authors cited are not the only ones to have signalled examples of this type, in 
which the modal meaning of (various types of) possibility of the verbs is superseded 
by a characterisation in terms of the illocutionary force of the utterance in which they 
occur. Examples of this type have been discussed in several branches of linguistics: 
they are pointed out in grammars, and feature in work on discourse analysis as well as 
in the pragmatics literature
3
. As already hinted at by Palmer (1990), and as formulated 
more firmly by Aijmer (1996: 128), and Leech (2014: 315), it is specific 
‗conventional forms‘ or combinations that come with a specific, ‗conventional‘ 
illocutionary force. One may wonder what specific contextual effect is at stake here, 
or what it is that has led researchers to signal out these uses in discussions of the 
meaning of modal verbs. After all, all utterances have an illocutionary force, and it is 
not only utterances with modals that are associated with a direct as well as an indirect 
speech act. It seems that the ‗pragmatic effect‘ at stake in examples of this type is 
quite different from that of pragmatic strengthening and weakening, which appears to 
modulate the meaning of the modal verbs far more dramatically. 
 
2.3 Strength 
A further feature of modals is that of strength. In English grammars, pairs of necessity 
modals are often teamed up and the differences between them are explained in terms 
                                                             
2
 ICE-AUS refers to the Australian component of the International Corpus of English. 
3
 See Ruytenbeek (2017) for a critical overview of experimental work on the comprehension of indirect 
requests. 
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of the strength of the modality. In the following sets of examples, for instance, one 
modal (have got to in (10), be to in (11)) is said to communicate a more forceful 
necessity than another (should in (10), ought to in (11)) in the sense that the pressure 
on the addressee to bring about the situation referred to is more compelling when the 
‗stronger‘ modal verb is used: 
(10)  I‘ve got to/should call my mother – it‘s her birthday. (Depraetere & Langford 
2012: 311) 
(11) She is to/ought to report directly to me in such circumstances (ibid.) 
Clearly, all of these sentences communicate non-epistemic necessity and the 
parameter of strength does not in itself result in semantic meaning distinctions in the 
examples in (10) and (11): here, it does not bring about truth-conditionally distinct 
types of necessity. This observation notwithstanding, strength has a major role to play 
in differentiating contexts of use of modal verbs. In the examples just given, it is the 
lexical item in itself that has a specific strength; it is not the context that bestows a 
specific strength on the modal. While views on the strength of the sets of verbs in the 
examples in (10) and (11), even when they are not used in context, are quite 
unanimous (have got is stronger than should; be to is stronger than ought to), as soon 
as one draws the whole range of root necessity verbs into the discussion, positioning 
them on a continuum of strength is a lot more delicate. Verhulst, Depraetere & 
Heyvaert (2013) address should, ought to and be supposed to and they observe that 
opinions in the literature on where these modals feature on the scale of strength 
diverge and conflict. Once one moves beyond the clear, ‗inherent strength‘ minimal 
pairs (Verhulst, Depraetere & Heyvaert 2013: 211), operationalizing the notion of 
strength is a challenge. In the paper just cited, strength is measured in terms of 
contexts of use, that is, in terms of the possibility of non-compliance and the gravity 
of potential consequences of non-compliance, the latter necessarily involving a 
culture-specific and delicate assessment (ibid.). Alternatively, one could try to capture 
‗contextual strength‘ (Verhulst, Depraetere & Heyvaert 2013: 220) in terms of the 
speech acts performed by the utterances in which different verbs typically feature, 
different types of directives being indicative of a more or less pressing necessity
4
. 
The observations on strength have so far highlighted the following points: first, one 
might try to attribute inherent, context-independent strength to specific modals, with a 
                                                             
4 See Sbisà (2001) for an insightful discussion of illocutionary force and strength. 
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continuum from ‗very strong‘ to ‗weak‘. A scale such as the following might result 
from an approach along these lines
5
: 
 
very strong strong weak 
 
must 
have got to 
be to 
have to be supposed to 
ought to 
should 
 
However, this leaves us with modal verbs such as want to, need to and need, the 
location of which on the cline is not straight forward. A second issue, with respect to 
the modals that are positioned in the same area on the scale of modal strength, is that 
of determining the contextual clues which make it possible to differentiate the modals, 
either in terms of more delicate distinctions concerning modal strength or in terms of 
other features. Neither the former nor the latter is a straightforward task. With respect 
to a more delicate measurement of strength, one might want to look for contexts in 
which, say, each of the very strong modals is typically used (along the lines of 
Verhulst, Depraetere & Heyvaert 2013, for instance). As observed in section 2.1, even 
strong modals may be pragmatically weakened, so this is a factor that needs to be 
looked at as well: getting a more accurate view on how often this happens might also 
shed further light on the meaning potential of the different modals. Or, alternatively, 
one might want to argue that the criterion of strength does not necessarily 
discriminate modals and that there are other distinguishing features at play that 
differentiate context of use of all ‗very strong‘ modals. The question that arises here 
in general is whether inherent, context-independent strength should be differentiated 
from strength that is determined in context. A difference in ‗strength‘ occasionally 
results in semantically distinct utterances (must will not be used to make a 
recommendation, and should will not be used to enforce a law). The following 
example is a recent case in point reported in on the media, which shows that the 
strength of a modal can impact dramatically on the meaning communicated
6
: 
                                                             
5
 See Verhulst, Depraetere & Heyvaert (2013) for a more delicate analysis of differences in strength 
among be supposed to, ought to and should. 
6
 I‘m grateful to Giuditta Caliendo for drawing my attention to this example, which is online at the 
following address: http://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/paris-climate-talks-tic-toc-216721. 
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(12)  After years of preparation and two weeks of tireless negotiations, after all the 
speeches and backroom compromising, one misplaced word brought the 
momentum toward a historic global deal on climate change to a halt Saturday — 
for at least a few hours. 
Obama administration lawyers discovered early in the day that the latest draft 
text had a potentially deal-killing tweak: Deep into the document, in Article 4, 
was a line declaring that wealthier countries ―shall‖ set economy-wide targets 
for cutting their greenhouse gas pollution. 
That may not sound like such a headache-inducing roadblock, but in the 
world of international climate negotiations, every word counts. In previous 
drafts, the word ―shall‖ had been ―should‖ — and in the lingo of U.N. climate 
agreements, ―shall‖ implies legal obligation and ―should‖ does not. That means 
the word change could have obliged the Obama administration to submit the 
final deal to the Senate for its approval. And inevitably, the GOP-led chamber 
would kill it on sight. 
In other cases though, the selection of the modal with the wrong ‗strength 
potential‘ will merely result in contextually inappropriate sequences (as in (10) and 
(11)).  
 
2.4 Subjective vs. objective modality 
The distinction between ‗objective modality‘ and ‗subjective modality‘ is another 
opposition that is very much in the foreground in discussions of the meaning of modal 
verbs
7
. For instance, should has been argued by some to be somewhat more subjective 
than ought to (Declerck 1991, Larreya & Rivière 2005: 126). Likewise, must is said to 
be subjective in the sense that the necessity emanates from the speaker, unlike have 
to, for instance, which is considered to be more objective (Huddleston & Pullum 
2002). In a similar way, may communicates so-called speaker/hearer permission, 
while can communicates neutral or objective permission (Larreya & Rivière 2005: 96, 
Quirk et al. 1985):  
                                                             
7 See, for instance, Verstraete (2001) for a very insightful discussion of the notions of subjective and 
objective modality. As is the case for all the topics addressed in this short paper, it is only possible to 
touch upon aspects relevant to the main topic of the paper; each of them obviously involves more 
encompassing research questions. 
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(13a) I ought to congratulate her, but I don‘t think I will. (‗Should would sound odd 
here: it would be strange to give yourself advice and then add that you were not 
going to follow it.‘) (Declerck 1991: 377) 
(13b) You should act according to your own conscience. (ibid.) 
(14a) You have to come in now. (‗I‘m likely to be relaying someone else‘s 
instruction‘) (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 205) 
(14b) You must come in. (‗it‘s more likely I am myself telling you to.‘ (ibid.)) 
(15a) You may leave when you like. ‗[= ‗I permit you to …‘]‘ (Quirk et al. 1985: 224) 
(15b) You can leave when you like. ‗[= ‗You are permitted …‘], which can mean 
permission in a more general and impersonal sense‘ (ibid.) 
As in the case of strength in the examples in (10) and (11), the feature of 
subjectivity in itself does not seem to result in semantic distinctions, in the sense that 
the basic modal meaning is that of necessity ((13a) to (14b)) or of possibility (or more 
precisely, permission ((15a) and (15b)), irrespective of whether the modal is 
considered to be subjective or objective. Replacing one modal by the other in the set 
will result in utterances that are less appropriate or acceptable, but the semantics of he 
utterances remain overall the same. 
A number of observations must be added: first, a quantitative analysis of the 
sources associated with should and ought to (Verhulst, Depraetere & Heyvaert 2013) 
shows that both should and ought to are typically associated with a subjective source
8
. 
In this paper, the distinction between subjective and objective modality has been 
operationalised in terms of the source of the modality: if it is the speaker who is at the 
origin of the possibility/necessity, the modality is said to be subjective; if it is 
circumstances or a rule, for instance, that make it possible/necessary for a situation to 
actualise, the modality is said to be objective. The data in Depraetere and Verhulst 
(2008) show that have to is significantly correlated with a circumstantial source as 
well as with a necessity resulting from a rule or a regulation. Must is likewise 
typically used in the latter context and also when a situation is necessary in order to 
reach a specific goal or purpose, as in the following example: 
(16a) And the free world has reacted quickly to this momentous process and must 
continue to do so if it is to help and influence events. (ICE-GB) 
                                                             
8
 See e.g. Cappelle and De Sutter‘s (2010) paper on should and ought to for a different approach to the 
operationalisation of subjectivity for corpus analysis. 
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(16b) To reach it on foot you must navigate hundreds of miles across a perishing sub-
zero landscape of blizzards, open water, crevasses and drifting ice. (ICE-GB) 
In other words, the traditional generalisations need to be fine-tuned. Ought to and 
should are similar in the sense that they are typically associated with a subjective 
source, so this begs the question of what differentiates them. Verhulst, Depraetere and 
Heyvaert (2013) argue that one parameter that differentiates should and ought to is 
that of target: who or what the situation to be brought about is beneficial to. It is 
shown that in the case of ought to, it is an instance other than the speaker who benefits 
from the actualisation of the situation, whereas should does not reveal a similar 
orientation towards the addressee or a third party. Put differently, in order to 
differentiate the meaning of, for instance, necessity modals, a wider range of 
contextual features needs to be taken into account. Finally, while spelling out the 
subjective/objective parameter in terms of modal source enables us to differentiate the 
semantic profile of modal verbs, and while statistically significant patterns can be 
observed, most modals are compatible with the total range of sources. As was pointed 
out before, in each of the three sets of examples given in this section, the modal 
meaning remains constant, irrespective of the source the modal verb is associated 
with. It is not possible to find examples similar to (12) in which the parameter of 
strength dramatically changes the semantics of the sentence: the use of, for instance, a 
subjective necessity modal rather than an objective necessity at most affects 
acceptability judgements. 
 
3. Context-dependent semantic features vs. pragmatic features 
The four types of meaning distinctions mentioned above do not exhaust the list of 
facets of modal meaning that are determined in context. Still, they bring up some 
interesting questions, and they will, in this section, be used to show that it is necessary 
to make explicit the semantics-pragmatics interface and what it means for a feature to 
contribute to a semantic distinction or a pragmatic distinction. Given the scope of the 
paper, the reflections here are necessarily programmatic and result in questions to be 
explored rather than in definitive answers to them. 
A first observation is that it is not always made entirely clear in the empirical 
literature whether the meaning distinctions are semantic or pragmatic in nature, or at 
least, what exactly is meant when one labels a feature as capturing the semantics 
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rather than a pragmatic feature of modal verbs. Recent advances in pragmatic theory 
and corpus linguistics have resulted in different views on where the borderline should 
be drawn and even on the necessity of drawing a line. While all scholars agree that 
modal meaning is to a certain degree determined in context, they do not necessarily 
spell out this view in more detail in terms of a specific theoretical stance to the 
semantics/pragmatics interface. A few quotes from leading scholars will show what is 
at stake. In the introduction to the second edition of Modality and the English modals, 
Palmer (1990) writes: ‗the terms ‗meaning‘, ‗semantic‘ and ‗semantics‘ are used 
throughout the book in a general sense, to include what might also be included under 
‗notions‘, ‗use‘ and ‗function‘, except where a specific distinction is drawn‘ (ibid.: 2-
3). Consider the following observation by Gärdenfors (2006):  
―What could be the relevant tools for analyzing the meaning of such modal 
expressions? First of all, it is unnatural to ask for reference of modal verbs, 
let alone their reference in other possible worlds. The modal verbs have a 
role not in relation to the sentence in which they occur, but in relation to 
the speech act in which they are uttered (Austin 1962, Searle 1979). 
Consequently, the main linguistic objects of the analysis will be speech 
acts. The meaning of modal verbs is thus more a matter of pragmatics than 
of traditional (referential) semantics.‖ (Gärdenfors 2006: 162).  
This author offers an analysis of deontic uses of modals in terms of power 
relations: the core meanings of the modal verbs are considered to be ‗determined by 
the power structure of the speech act situation in which they are used‘ (ibid.: 171). In 
this analysis, pragmatics is seen as relating to the use of expressions, and as modals 
cannot be studied without considering their use, the conclusion is that ‗the traditional 
distinction between semantics and pragmatics may not be possible to sustain‘ (ibid.: 
172). Likewise, in Construction Grammar, for instance, the key insight is that 
constructions are form-function pairings, and that the functional level is holistic and 
does not necessarily require a line to be drawn between the traditional layers of 
meaning.  
Another view is that according to which semantics refers to the truth-conditional 
content of the utterance, pragmatics being reserved for meaning effects that are 
communicated but do not impact on truth-conditions. Contextualist approaches, such 
as the relevance-theoretic model advocated by Carston (2015) or that of truth-
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conditional pragmatics argued for by Recanati (2010), have shown that the 
proposition that is explicitly communicated (the ‗explicature‘ as it is called in 
Relevance Theory) involves quite more input from the context than had been assumed 
by Grice: apart from contextual input to assign reference and to disambiguate, certain 
expressions need to be saturated ((17a) and (17b)) or are subject to the process of free 
pragmatic enrichment ((18a) and (18b)). On this view, in the examples in (17), the 
information in brackets is determined in context and is part of what is explicitly 
communicated. The additional information is required to arrive at a full proposition: 
(17a) The winners each get £1,000. [of what?] (Carston 2015: 199) 
(17b) It‘s hot enough. [for what?] (ibid.) 
In the examples in (18a) and (18b), there is a proposition that is truth-evaluable but 
is not the one that is intended by the speaker; the bracketed information is likewise 
part of the explicature, which is ‗an assumption which is communicated (speaker 
meant) and is developed out of one of the encoded logical forms (semantic 
representations) of the sentence uttered (Sperber & Wilson 1995 [1986]: 182 in 
Carston 2015: 198). 
(18a) Something has happened [important, unexpected, strange, …] (Carston 2015: 
199) 
(18b) Louis has always been a great lecturer [since she became a lecturer]. (ibid.: 200) 
While this selection of potential theoretical stances is admittedly sketchy, it does 
highlight the challenge to be faced when pinning down the meaning of modals. A 
non-controversial semantic distinction is that some modals communicate necessity 
while others communicate possibility. A further relatively non-controversial semantic 
distinction is that between epistemic and non-epistemic meanings. Views are already 
less unanimous when the next step (not addressed in this paper) is considered: are the 
different meanings that, for instance, possibility modals can communicate (such as 
permission, ability, and dynamic modality (Huddleston & Pullum 2002)), 
semantically distinct? While some have argued that possibility modals have one 
unitary meaning; others maintain that modals are polysemous
9
. At this level, a further 
question is whether it is possible to pin down similar differentiated meaning 
categories on the non-epistemic necessity side. In general, non-epistemic necessity 
                                                             
9 See Depraetere (2014) and Depraetere & Reed (2011) for an in-depth discussion of this question. 
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appears as more of an organic block in analyses of modal verbs, so the question here 
is whether it makes sense to distinguish, for instance, between subject-internal 
necessity (I must have that dress), and subject-external modality (I must return the 
form by the end of the month), or, for instance, between deontic necessity (You must 
pay me back) and non-deontic necessity (Bills must be settled by the end of the 
month). A further level of meaning involves the distinctions taken stock of in the 
previous sections: are they pragmatic in nature in the sense that they are not part of 
the explicit content in Contextualist terms? Or do they impact on the truth-conditional 
content, despite the fact that they are determined in context? While some of the 
meanings can indeed be captured in terms of implicatures (indirect speech acts, 
pragmatic strengthening and pragmatic weakening), others (illocutionary force, the 
strength of the modal, the subjective/objective nature of modal verbs) cannot. It 
remains to be seen though, to what extent the latter category of features determines 
the semantic profile of the modal verbs in the sense that they are part of the 
explicature. 
A further observation relates to the level (lexical or sentential) at which the 
features are at play: indirect speech acts and illocutionary force bear on the utterance 
in which the modal is embedded while subjective/objective modality and strength of 
the modal pertain more exclusively to the modal verbs as such. It was argued in 
section 2.3 that certain necessity modals have a context-independent clear profile in 
terms of the strength of the necessity they express while others are harder to 
categorise. Moreover, strength can also be determined in terms of the contexts in 
which the modals are embedded, so it seems that while strength is a distinguishing, 
semantic feature in some cases, further thought needs to be given to ways in which 
this concept can be operationalised for empirical analysis in order to pin down the 
inherent strength of a modal. 
These brief observations have shown that even though modal meaning has received 
a lot of attention, the analyses can still be improved in terms of spelling out the nature 
of the features involved from the perspective of the semantics-pragmatics interface, 
and this obviously requires a specific theoretical stance with respect to the line that is 
to be drawn. Clearly, further empirical research into the ways in which the context 
impacts on the meaning that is communicated by an utterance with a modal is needed 
to inform the decision-making process. 
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